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Language is central to the process of acquiring knowledge of for-
eign law in at least two ways: one obvious, the other perhaps less so.'
The obvious function is to provide access to information. Language is
a tool for acquiring information from and about a foreign legal sys-
tem, because that information is imbedded in language. Language
also performs, however, a second function that is less frequently ac-
knowledged, but no less important: it shapes what the user knows.
This knowledge-shaping (or "cognitive") role is of fundamental im-
portance, because it conditions all knowledge of foreign law. Despite
this, however, little attention has been paid to this role.2 This Article
focuses on one aspect of the role of language in shaping knowledge of
foreign law.
Those seeking to know foreign law typically assume that the best
source (or at least a very good source) of what they want to know is a
text that is considered authoritative in the legal system in which they
are interested. In fact, the more authoritative the text, the more valu-
able it is assumed to be. The strategy is attractive. The knowledge-
seeker uses it in her own system, and she is accustomed to valuing it.
Moreover, it seems only logical and appropriate to refer to high-
authority texts, because they are, by definition, important and influ-
ential, at least formally. Other factors remaining constant, the higher
the authority value that supports a legal argument within any system,
the stronger that argument is likely to be. In general, therefore, the
more authoritative a statement of law is, the more valuable it is as-
sumed to be for knowing the law.
* Distinguished Professor of Law. Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.A., Trinity College
(Conn.) (1967); M.A., Yale University (1969); J.D., University of Chicago (1972).
1. An earlier version of this Article was presented at a symposium on law and language
held in Milan. Italy, in May 2003. The papers presented there will be published in a symposium
volume entitled ORDINARY LANGUAGE AND LEGAL LANGUAGE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
LAW (Antonio Gambaro ed., forthcoming 2004).
2. For discussion, see David J. Gerber, Sculpting the Agenda of Comparative Law: Ernst
Rabel and the Facade of Language, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 190
(Annelise Riles ed., 2001).
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When applied to foreign law, however, this knowledge acquisi-
tion strategy is fundamentally flawed. It is based on a misperception
of the relationship between language and its referents, and, as a re-
sult, it is likely to produce inaccurate knowledge. In this Article, I
examine the role of authoritative texts in acquiring knowledge of for-
eign law, focusing on ways in which uninformed use of them can dis-
tort knowledge of foreign law.
My central claim is that the capacity of authoritative language to
accurately convey information within a legal system tends to be in-
versely related to its capacity to create accurate knowledge for those
outside the system (system "outsiders"). Put another way, the more
authoritative the text, the greater the discrepancy is likely to be
between its intra-system value (i.e., to users within the system) and its
inter-system value (i.e., its value to an outsider).
The operative factor in producing this counterintuitive result is
the role of what I call "authority heuristics" within legal systems. I use
the term to refer to specific cognitive tools used in interpreting texts.
They consist primarily of assumptions about the influence of texts on
decision makers. Each legal system has its own set of such tools and
its own "know how" for using them. They enable those within the
system to "know" the law. When a system outsider interprets a text,
however, she is likely to use the "wrong" authority heuristics-usually
because she uses those she has learned to apply in her own system
rather than those of the target system. As a consequence, she is likely
to misread the text to the extent of the differences between these two
sets of heuristics.
This means that effective use of authoritative legal texts by out-
siders requires specific translation strategies and tools that are de-
signed to detect authority heuristics and correct the distortions they
are likely to introduce. Where heuristics differ, interpretive tools are
needed to counteract the knowledge-distorting impact of these differ-
ences.
The Article has three main objectives. One is to explore the role
of authoritative language in trans-system knowledge acquisition and
to identify the consequences of strategies that fail to account for that
role. A second is to develop the concept of authority heuristics and
explore its implications. Finally, I suggest a means of reducing the
knowledge-distorting impact of authority heuristics and thus increas-
ing the accuracy of knowledge of foreign law. It centers on the poten-
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tial value of developing "authority templates" for use with authorita-
tive texts.
I. ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LAW: THE LANGUAGE
FACTOR
A. The Task: Knowing Foreign Law
It is important to clarify at the outset what I mean by "knowing"
foreign law. For our purposes here, I assume that an individual (or
group or institution) wants to know foreign law in the sense that she
(or they or it) wants to know the consequences that a foreign legal
system is likely to attach to particular conduct. In most cases, this is
the only information that has value for the outside knowledge seeker.
She wants to know what the legal system does-i.e., what happens
there under the conditions in which she is interested. The knowledge
seeker may, of course, have other objectives such as, for example, to
earn a fee or to engage in academic analysis, but these are not our
concern here.
In order to achieve this objective, she needs the capacity to
predict decisions that can affect her legal status in that system. Spe-
cifically, she needs to be able to predict the decisions of individuals
and groups within those legal institutions that can affect relevant legal
outcomes. For these purposes, to know "the law" is to predict the deci-
sions that are likely to be made under particular circumstances.
Where, for example, she wants to "know the law" relating to an in-
vestment that she plans within a particular legal system, her concern
is with the decisions that are likely to be made within that system that
may affect her investment. What a particular legal text says is relevant
only insofar as it influences those decisions. These decisions are the
only meaningful way in which "law" will be operationalized in the
situations in which she is interested. This focus on decisions has been
insufficiently emphasized, but it is central to our analysis.3
The capacity of an outsider to predict such decisions depends on
two main factors. One is access to sufficient information about the
factors likely to influence the decision in which she is interested. In
3. For discussion, see David J. Gerber, Globalization and Legal Knowledge: Implications
for Comparative Law, 75 TUL. L. REV. 949 (2001) [hereinafter Globalization and Legal Knowl-
edge]; David J. Gerber, System Dynamics: Toward a Language of Comparative Law?, 46 AM. J.
COMP. L. 719 (1998) [hereinafter System Dynamics].
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other words, she must have access to sufficient information (or data)
to make an accurate prediction possible. In the above example, she
needs to know, inter alia, the content of any legal texts that the rele-
vant decision makers may use in making decisions. The other factor is
cognitive: she needs the capacity to process that data in ways that will
yield the desired knowledge. The data in raw form is seldom of value.
To know what a statute or a judicial decision says, for example,
conveys little, if any, information that is relevant for these purposes.'
It acquires value only to the extent that it is processed appropriately.
The outside knowledge seeker must use language to obtain the
information she seeks, because that information is embodied in lan-
guage and unlikely to be acquired in other ways.5 It can seldom, for
example, be conveyed through other means of communication (e.g.,
gestures). Moreover, an outsider is seldom in a position to engage in
the kind of empirical observation of the events in a foreign system
that would enable her to make predictions about what decisions are
likely to be taken there under particular circumstances. That means
of acquiring information is likely to take too long and entail costs that
are too high. The problem then is how to extract from words the kind
of information that enables the user to predict decisions in the foreign
system with reasonable accuracy.
Assume, for example, that a legal professional in country A
wants to know whether particular conduct in country B will encounter
legal problems. Her client would like to exchange with a competitor
in country B specific information about prices of a product that both
sell in B. She knows that in A such conduct would be considered anti-
competitive and violate the antitrust or "competition" laws, and she
wants to understand the situation her client faces in B.
She is likely to turn to a source that she considers authoritative as
part of her inquiry.6 She may, for example, look at official govern-
ment pronouncements or at legal decisions or at high-status legal
4. See Gerber, Globalization and Legal Knowledge, supra note 3, at 964-69.
5. This objective is sometimes referred to as "learning the rules" of the foreign system.
This codes the task-i.e., gives it a name, and it may represent a reasonable approximation of
what the outsider wants to know. The problem is that the term is not always used this way. It
may be used to refer merely to the formal rules articulated within the system, regardless of their
impact on actual decisions, and it is often difficult to distinguish between the two uses.
6. She may, of course, ask a lawyer in that system for information, but even if she does,
she will also often look at sources that are considered authoritative within the system either in
preparation for asking questions of the foreign lawyer or in confirming or expatiating upon the
information provided by the foreign lawyer. In some cases, the advice of a particular lawyer may
itself carry authority within the system.
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commentaries. She is particularly likely to investigate whether there is
a statute that contains the competition law of B. If there is, she is
likely to use its language in assessing the legal situation in which she is
interested.' She assumes that the language of the statute provides
information that will inform her assessment of the legal situation.8
What she is not likely to recognize is that the information repre-
sented by the text may be of no value to her and may even be highly
misleading. If she does not possess the interpretive tools to give it
operational meaning-i.e., unless she has the capacity to predict its
influence on decisions in B that may affect her, this is precisely what
is likely to happen. We will return to this example, but at this point its
role is merely to focus attention on the need to find "operational
meaning" in foreign texts.
It is important for our analysis here to draw a distinction be-
tween "information" and "knowledge." I use the term "information"
to refer to data in an objective sense-outside of its relation to a par-
ticular knower. Facts, rules, and procedures in a legal system exist as
data and outside of any relationship to a knower. In contrast, I here
use "knowledge" to refer to that which an individual (or group) sub-
jectively knows-i.e., her images of the objective world.9 It consists of
information that has been processed by a particular knower.'0 The act
of knowing relates the information to a knower, thereby transforming
information into knowledge."
The concept of system is central to this analysis. I have referred
to acquiring knowledge about another "system," and I need, there-
fore, to explain briefly how I am using the term. In general usage, the
term "system" refers to the legal institutions within a particular politi-
cal unit or sub-unit and the operation of those institutions.2 The
7. For an analysis of legal language that focuses primarily on English and American
experience, see PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE (1999); see also DAVID MELLINKOFF,
THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (1963); LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES
(1993).
8. How she proceeds in seeking to know the foreign legal situation may depend on a
variety of factors. She may wish to rely on her own reading of the foreign text in making some
decisions, but for other decisions turn to sources such as foreign legal experts for elaboration or
confirmation. In either case, the knowledge that she acquires from the text plays a role in her
decision making.
9. These images are usually multi-layered. For an insightful and now classic discussion,
see KENNETH E. BOULDING. THE IMAGE: KNOWLEDGE IN LIFE AND SOCIETY (1956).
10. For a somewhat similar distinction, see JOHN SEELY BROWN & PAUL DUGUID, THE
SOCIAL LIFE OF INFORMATION (2000).
11. The terms "objective knowledge" and "subjective knowledge" arc sometimes used to
describe a related distinction, but I find that usage cumbersome and potentially misleading.
12. See Gerber, System Dy'namics, supra note 3, at 729.
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"Italian legal system" is generally understood to refer to the legal
institutions of the Italian state and their operations. This definition is
useful, but our objectives here call for somewhat more precision. I use
the term to refer to: (1) a political entity that expresses its authority in
a form that is intended to be interpreted and applied (i.e., in a written
or spoken legal "text"), (2) the legal texts and norms that represent
that authority, (3) the institutions, groups and individuals that have
authority to interpret and apply the texts, and (4) the individuals and
groups that regularly influence those institutions in interpreting and
applying those texts. I use the term "insider" to refer to an individual
who is either educated in a system or has extensive experience with its
operations. I use the term "outsider" to refer to an individual who is
neither educated in the system nor has extensive experience with its
operations.
B. Distorting Factors: Obstacles to Knowing Foreign Law
The task of the outsider who seeks knowledge about a legal sys-
tem is then to extract meaning from language. But how? Three fac-
tors can impair the capacity of language to provide an accurate image
of a system's law to an outsider. One is the lack of conceptual corre-
spondence between the legal language of the two systems. Each legal
language contains its own concepts, structures (relationships among
concepts), and meaning units, and they do not necessarily correspond
to those of any other system. When an outsider uses her own legal
language to interpret information from another legal system, she
naturally processes that information in the categories of her own sys-
tem. In effect, she translates the concepts, structures, and institutions
of the foreign system into her own legal language, and this inevitably
creates distortions. 13 For example, a "trust" (a legal institution created
and developed in the English common law tradition) does not exist as
such in most civil law systems, but somewhat similar terms in other
legal systems (e.g., Treuhand in the German system) are sometimes
used to translate it. This form of "translation" inevitably distorts
knowledge, often in ways that are hard to detect. This problem has
13. For a recent study of specific instances of this, see Sofie M.F. Geeroms, Comparative
Law and Legal Translation: Why the Terms Cassation, Revision and Appeal Should Not Be
Translated .... 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 201 (2002).
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been studied with much insight in recent years, most notably by
Rodolfo Sacco, Antonio Gambaro, and their students. 14
A second obstacle involves the methods or conventions used in
interpreting texts. Where an outsider employs methods from her own
system in interpreting texts from another system, those methods are
likely to differ from those used within the target system. As a result,
she is likely to "read" the texts differently than if she used the meth-
ods of the target system, and this also distorts her knowledge. Where,
for example, a lawyer trained in the U.S. reads the text of the German
civil code, the interpretive methods that she employs in reading the
text will differ significantly from those that German lawyers use in
reading it. All German lawyers are trained to apply a well-defined
and well-structured interpretive methodology of which she will be
unaware. As a result, her reading of that text is likely to produce dis-
torted knowledge of what the language "means" within the German
system.
These two sources of distortion are not specific to legal texts, but
inhere in the process of translation itself. Whenever a text is trans-
lated from one language into another, some distortion is inevitable,
because there is never perfect conceptual correspondence between
languages. Moreover, all readers apply interpretive methods in read-
ing texts, and differences in those methods lead to differences in
interpretation.
Because they are common to translation of any kind, these
sources of distortion are likely to be at least recognized by anyone
who has had significant experience with a foreign language."S For ex-
ample, where I use a translation of a Turkish legal text, I am likely to
be aware that Turkish lawyers might interpret the text differently
than I interpret it and that the chances of an exact correspondence
between the Turkish original and my translation are remote. I may
choose not to pay attention to these distorting factors, but the prob-
lem is at least readily recognizable.
14. See, e.g., Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law,
39 AM. J. COMP. L. I (pt.I) & 343 (pt.ll) (1991); ANTONIO GAMBARO & RODOLFO SACCO,
SISTEMI GIURIDICI COMPARATI (2d ed. 2002).
15. For discussion, see THEORIES OF TRANSLATION (Raincr Schulte & John Biguenet eds.,
1992).
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II. AUTHORITY AND LEGAL LANGUAGE
A third source of distortion is, however, specific to legal lan-
guage. It results from the role of authority in legal language, a role
that does not exist, at least in the same form, in other types of texts.
6
The relationship between authority and legal texts affects the capacity
of an outsider to acquire accurate knowledge of foreign law, but that
role is seldom noted. 7 Its impact may be as fundamental as the two
other distorting factors just mentioned, and its effects may be more
insidious because they are less likely to be recognized.
As noted above, texts that are considered authoritative within
the target system are frequently central to the strategies used in
acquiring knowledge of law. These may include, inter alia, official
legislative or administrative acts, the decisions of courts, and certain
pronouncements of particular individuals or institutions. For the sys-
tem insider such texts are often of value, because their authoritative
status means that they often have extensive influence on decision-
making, and the insider typically knows which decisions they are
likely to influence and in what ways. They are, therefore, an impor-
tant guide to what is likely to happen.
In a continental European legal system, for example, a civil code
typically has extensive influence on several aspects of decision mak-
ing related to private law. It is a source of specific guidance in particu-
lar cases. Courts, scholars, and legal practitioners turn to it to
determine whether it provides an answer to specific questions. In ad-
dition, however, it often provides the language of the private law-its
concepts, structures, and grammar-and thus provides a means of
understanding how decision makers think about legal issues and how
they conceptualize and evaluate the decisions they must make. In
order to predict its influence on decisions, therefore, an insider must
undergo extensive training in the structure and content of the code,
and she must also learn who uses it and how they use it. She must
learn, for example, how the methods of statutory interpretation are
applied by the courts and other institutions to find answers to legal
questions.
16. The languages of some religions such as Islam play similar roles insofar as they seek to
establish and enforce norms of social conduct.
17. For discussion of the concept of authority, see BRUCE LINCOLN, AUTHORITY:
CONSTRUCTION AND CORROSION (1994).
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Outsiders often also rely on authoritative texts in seeking knowl-
edge of law. One reason is the natural tendency to use knowledge-
acquisition strategies with which one is familiar. Authoritative texts
have formal weight and status in all legal systems, and thus they seem
to represent a particularly reliable source of information in any
system. Having learned to rely on authoritative texts in one's own
system, the outsider has strong incentives to assume that this will be a
useful strategy in a foreign system. A further reason for this reliance
on authoritative texts is that few knowledge seekers know any other
way to proceed in seeking knowledge from a foreign legal system.
They are not likely to be aware of alternative strategies.18 Even if an
outsider is willing to invest the mental and other resources to acquire
such knowledge, she is often simply unaware of the elements of such
an alternate strategy. Finally, it seems efficient and reasonable to as-
sume that whatever is valuable to an insider is valuable to an outsider.
The problem is that this strategy is likely to provide a distorted
image of foreign law. The factors that make an authoritative text
valuable to the insider who is seeking legal knowledge are often the
same ones that distort that knowledge for the outsider.
III. AUTHORITY HEURISTICS: CONCEPT AND ROLE
A closer look at the role of authority in legal texts reveals why
this is so. I take as a starting point for this analysis that the language
of an authoritative text does not by itself tell a reader anything about
what happens in a legal system. It cannot (by itself) contain the opera-
tional meaning of the text-i.e., its influence on decisions. Conse-
quently, by itself it is of no necessary value to someone who seeks to
know what consequences are likely to attach to conduct in a foreign
system. Its impact on decisions can be assessed only if one knows how
and by whom the text is used.
Several factors are relevant to determining the influence of the
text on decisions. They include the following: Who applies the text?
What is the role and influence of those persons and institutions?
Where do particular decision makers turn for guidance in applying
the text? What methods do they use to extract linguistic meaning
from the text? What are their incentives in making particular deci-
sions? What is the status of the text? Answers to these questions pro-
18. In many countries (including the U.S.) relatively few students take courses in compara-
tive law, and comparative law courses often do not deal with the issues raised here.
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vide the basis for assessing what decisions are likely to be made in
that system under specific circumstances.
Texts generally exercise influence on decision making in system-
atic ways-i.e., in ways that follow patterns. It is this patterning that
makes prediction possible. For example, methods used in interpreting
texts tend to be highly standardized, albeit at varying levels of preci-
sion. In many systems, teaching the standard methods of statutory
interpretation is a major focus of legal education.
9 Those who make
decisions within the system tend to apply these methods or at least
orient their decisions according to them, not only because they have
learned them, but also because the system rewards those who do so.
As a result, these methods tend to play a major role in determining
outcomes, and the person who knows these methods and recognizes
the patterns of usage that they entrain has a powerful tool for predict-
ing decisional outcomes." These patterns and regularities are the key
to analyzing the influence of texts on decisions. All else being equal,
the greater the degree of patterning, the higher the potential predict-
ability.
A. The Concept
Where they are used for this purpose, these patterned influences
become tools of interpretation. The term "heuristics" captures this
role.21 The patterns represent tools for interpreting the operational
meaning of texts-i.e., for predicting how they are likely to influence
outcomes. In this sense they "translate" the text. The term "heuristic"
highlights the interpretive character of the analysis. More fundamen-
tally, the term labels this form of analysis, making it recognizable and
giving it independent status.
19. This is typically the case wherever a civil code is central to the operation of private law.
For Germany, see KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWLSSENSCHAFT (5th ed.
1983).
20. This merely recognizes that all institutions rest on patterns of behavior and that these
patterns effectively construct meaning within those institutions. For a now classic discussion of
this issue, see PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY: A TREATISE ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 47-92 (1966). The role of lan-
guage in this context is discussed in JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL
REALITY 59-79 (1995).
21. In this Article, the term "heuristic" is used in the traditional sense of a tool used for
interpretive purposes. Since the early 1970s, it has also been used in cognitive psychology to
refer to cognitive tools that represent deviations from rational decision making. Our usage here
does not carry that implication. See SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (Gerd Giger-
enzer et al. eds., 1999).
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Using "authority" with "heuristics" signals that this form of
interpretation relates to the influence or "authority" of the text. It is
precisely these patterns of authority or influence that are the tools of
interpretation. The form of meaning involved is not the more tradi-
tional sense of deriving linguistic "content" from the text.2 Rather it
is the capacity to predict the probable influence of the text on deci-
sions within the system. This is, as noted above, the only meaning that
most users of legal knowledge value.
Each system has its own set of authority heuristics, and system
insiders typically know how to use them to help predict decisions in
particular circumstances. This knowledge is a kind of "know-how"
about the operations of the system.2 3 In order to know what the op-
erational impact of a text is, one needs to apply the appropriate
"authority heuristics" to it.
B. Knowledge Distortion and Authority Heuristics
Herein, however, lies the problem for an outside knowledge-
seeker: she is not likely to know what the authority heuristics of the
target system are. She is unlikely to be aware of the patterns of influ-
ence of texts and the ways in which they are used. As a result, she is
likely to apply heuristics that generate distorted knowledge.
The heuristics she is likely to apply instead are those from her
own system. The factors that lead her to rely on authority heuristics
from her own system are similar to those that cause her to rely on
authoritative texts in the first place. Her authority heuristics are part
of her cognition. They are, in effect, the only tools that she has for
this purpose, and, unless she is aware that they are likely to distort the
knowledge she acquires from reading the text, she is likely to use
them. Given that there is little awareness of the problem we are inves-
tigating, however, she is not likely to be aware of the distorting effects
of using such heuristics. Moreover, language is such a basic tool of
knowledge-acquisition that she has little incentive to question her
own practices. Self-examination of one's language practices is likely
to entail significant mental and perhaps emotional costs. To use the
same heuristic strategies in the foreign system that one uses in one's
own system is, therefore, both convenient and efficient.
22. For discussion of different forms of meaning, see MICHAEL POLANYI & HARRY
PROSCH, MEANING (1975).
23. For discussion, see, for example, HERBERT H. CLARK, ARENAS OF LANGUAGE USE
(1992).
20041
CHICAGO-KENT LA IV REVIEW
The result, however, is a distortion of the outsider's knowledge
of the relevant law in the target system. The authority heuristics that
give operational meaning to a text within a system tend to obscure
that meaning in an intersystemic context-i.e., for an outsider.
IV. EXAMPLE: THE (OFTEN) ILLUSORY VALUE OF STATUTES
The use of statutes by outsiders seeking knowledge of foreign
law illustrates some of these issues. The practice is common, the ad-
vice almost universal: If you want to know what the law is in a foreign
jurisdiction, statutes are the best source. Widespread reliance by out-
siders on texts of foreign statutes as a source of knowledge about for-
eign law has led publishers to invest heavily in producing
compilations of such statutes in both print and digital formats.
The reasons that outsiders often rely on statutes include those
just mentioned in relation to authoritative texts generally, but include
others as well. One involves the status of statutes. They represent
authoritative commands by the law-giving institutions of the polity.
Formally, they are "the law," and this encourages outsiders to rely on
them. 24 Another reason is their form. They tend to be generally appli-
cable or at least applicable to large categories of factual situations.
The language typically refers not to specific conduct by specific per-
sons, but to a general category of conduct. If one "knows" the ab-
stract legal formulation, one can easily suppose that she knows "the
law" applicable to all conduct that she considers to fall within that
category. Except in the relatively rare cases where a statute appears
to specifically address the fact situation in which the knowledge
seeker is interested, it is more efficient and potentially valuable to
know a general proposition than it is to look for answers in fact-dense
judicial opinions. There it is also often difficult to know which case(s)
to look at and how to relate them to other cases. As a result, outsiders
often assume that statutes produce the easiest, quickest, and cheapest
way of acquiring the knowledge that is sought. Their "authority" is
the basis for that assumption.
To read a foreign statute appears to provide useful information,
but the appearance is often misleading. As we have noted, the opera-
tional "meaning" of the statute cannot be derived from its language.
24. I use the term "rely" to specify a particular way in which the text is used. The problem
noted here arises where the user relies on a text to know the law, but a text may also be used in
other ways such as, for example, a starting or orientation point for assessing the legal situation.
[Vol 79:959
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What the knowledge-seeker wants to know is not encoded in the
words of the statute, and application of appropriate authority heuris-
tics is necessary to acquire this operational meaning.
We can now return to the example used earlier in which a legal
professional in country A wants to know whether particular conduct
in country B will encounter antitrust problems in that system.25 Recall
that she believes that she has identified a possible antitrust problem
in B, because she knows that such a problem exists under the laws of
her own system. Her knowledge of her own legal system has a further
effect, however, because it imbeds system-specific authority heuristics
in her perception of the text, and this can significantly impede her
capacity to acquire accurate knowledge of the legal situation in B.26
She knows who applies the statutory texts in A that are the basis
for her antitrust concerns there, and she knows how these texts influ-
ence decisions. For example, she knows that the text is applied in two
quite different institutional contexts. It is applied by a government
authority and by the regular courts in the context of private litigation.
The government office is an independent, well-funded competition
authority that can use the text to authorize an order not to engage in
what it considers to be anticompetitive conduct. In addition, a private
party injured by such conduct can also file a lawsuit in the regular
courts to prevent the conduct. She also knows that the decisions of
specific courts in prior cases serve as the primary source of guidance
for all relevant decision makers. Finally, she knows that a particular
type of economic theory will largely control the outcomes reached.
She uses these pieces of information in reading the text for its opera-
tional meaning. They represent, in other words, authority heuristics.
In system B, however, the outsider does not know how the anti-
trust (or competition law) statute is used-or by whom. She is likely
to assume, therefore, that the authority heuristics which she uses in
her own system also apply here, and she will read the text accord-
ingly. This leads her to assume that the text can be applied by the
regular courts as well as by an administrative body. In system B, how-
ever, there is no private enforcement of competition law texts. This
by itself radically changes the legal situation. Her home heuristics also
lead her to assume that the government office applying the statue is
25. See supra, text accompanying note 6.
26. These examples are based on numerous discussions in which I have participated and in
which U.S. lawyers (country A) have talked about competition law with non-U.S. lawyers,
particularly European lawyers (country B).
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well-funded and independent. In system B, this is not true. Competi-
tion law is applied only by a small staff of administrators, and they are
interested in applying it only to the conduct of very large firms. Their
actions are often also politically influenced. She may further assume
that decisions by courts in system B which are in some sense similar
to courts with which she is familiar in A provide the main authority
for decision makers. In B, however, commentaries on the statute by
academics, officials, and private lawyers often provide the main refer-
ence point for those making competition law decisions. And, finally,
she is likely to assume that the economic analysis used in her own
system will control the application of the legal principles in system B.
In B, however, economic analysis plays a far less important role in
applying competition law than do broader conceptions of market
integration, market access, and fairness.
As a result, without awareness of the authority heuristics that
should be applied to the foreign statute, she would fundamentally
misread the statute. The statute would provide for her a significantly
distorted and highly misleading picture of its role and of the legal
situation in the system in which she is seeking to know the law.
V. THE EXTENT OF COGNITIVE DISTORTION
Three factors are likely to influence the degree to which using
the wrong authority heuristics distorts knowledge of foreign law. One
is the degree of dissimilarity between the authority heuristics that
would be applied to a text or category of texts in the outsider's home
system and those that are typically used for similar texts or categories
of texts in the target system. We can use the term "heuristic distance"
to capture this factor. The greater the differences between the two
sets of authority heuristics, the greater the distortion is likely to be.
Using the example given above, the assumption that antitrust law
provisions are applicable in private litigation represents one degree of
distortion. The additional assumption that the antitrust authority is
politically independent increases the extent of distortion.
A second factor is the extent of influence of the text. The more
extensive the influence of a particular text or category of text on deci-
sion making in the target system, the greater the distortion that is
likely to be produced by applying the wrong authority heuristics to it.
If a text has high authority value for many decisions within a system,
applying inappropriate authority heuristics to it creates more exten-
sive distortions than if the role and influence of the text are minor.
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The complexity of the text's influence represents a third factor.
The more complex the influence of a text within a system, the greater
the distorting effects of using inappropriate authority heuristics are
likely to be. For example, a civil code typically exerts its influence not
only in obvious ways that are tied directly to particular language, but
by shaping thought about many overlapping categories of situations
and by creating, as noted above, a language for talking about and
thinking about law that is used throughout the legal system (or at
least its private law component). It becomes a pervasive means of
structuring thought and exerts influence in innumerable, often little
noticed or unconscious ways. Applying inappropriate authority heu-
ristics to the text may thus distort knowledge in many contexts, and
limited awareness of its many levels of influence is likely to reduce
opportunities for the user to correct for the distortions. In contrast, a
text prescribing how a military tribunal should apply a particular pun-
ishment has a direct, limited, and straightforward influence on a well-
defined class of decisions. Here the distortion that is likely to be
caused by applying inappropriate authority heuristics is limited, and
correcting for it is likely to be relatively straightforward.
VI. AN AUTHORITY TEMPLATE?: ROLE AND POTENTIAL VALUE
One means of counteracting the distorting effects of using the
wrong authority heuristics is to provide what I call an "authority tem-
plate" for specific texts and/or categories of texts. This could include
basic information regarding the influence of the text on selected types
of decisions. If, as I argue here, outsiders often use inappropriate
authority heuristics in interpreting a text and thereby acquire inaccu-
rate knowledge of the law in that system, then such a template should
reduce the distortion and produce more accurate knowledge.
The template for a particular text or category of texts could pro-
vide information relating to who uses the text, how it is typically used,
what influence it typically has on decision making within particular
institutions and so on. This would provide, in effect, a set of signposts
that could guide readers toward the use of more appropriate author-
ity heuristics and thus more accurate knowledge.
Let us return to the above example. The (private or public) pub-
lisher of the competition statute in system B could attach to that stat-
ute a template containing basic information about the way the statute
influences decision makers in the system and which decisions it influ-
ences. The template could note that the statute is applied only by a
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specific government office and that office is often subject to political
pressure. It could point out that in applying the statute, decision mak-
ers look for guidance primarily to statutory interpretations provided
in certain commentaries. It could clarify that the guiding principles
for interpretation are based primarily on considerations such as the
control of power and long-term fairness, particularly to smaller enter-
prises, and that pure economic theory plays little role in interpreting
the statute.
Such a template is likely to be of immediate, significant, and low-
cost value to outsiders using the text (as well as insiders unaware of
some of these factors). Above all, it would immediately flag for the
user the need to consider issues of decisional influence in assessing
and using the text. It would immediately signal that the outside user's
authority heuristics were not applicable in B. By specifying who ap-
plies the text, the template dramatically narrows the range of poten-
tial issues of application to which she has to attend and reduces the
cost of her search to know what kinds of legal consequences are likely
to attach to her client's conduct. By specifying what types of factors
influence the decision makers who apply the text, the template re-
duces the scope of potential misinterpretations of information pro-
vided about law in the area, enhances the capacity of the outsider to
understand information she receives from others, and facilitates effec-
tive discussion of the relevant issues. In short, such a template pro-
vides tools for interpreting the text's influence on decisions within the
system, and thus its operational meaning and thus has the potential to
enhance significantly the capacity of outsiders to "know" the law as it
operates in system B.
Providing such templates entails risks and problems, of course,
because a template can be "corrupted." A template may contain inac-
curate information, either because its creator erred in good faith in
preparing it or because her own personal interests influenced what
she included. In other words, both inadequate quality control and
intentional bias could lead to inaccuracy. This risk attaches to the
publication of any information, however, and effective use of the
information contained in templates would depend on informed use of
templates as an information source.
Detailed examination of ways of reducing such inaccuracies and
ways of avoiding reliance on them is beyond the scope of this Article,
but I note a few of the issues that may arise. Where a template is pro-
vided by a public source, it would be subject to whatever public
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scrutiny is available in that system, and a user would be advised to
apply whatever cautions are appropriate for the use of government
materials there. Where it is provided by a private source such as a
commercial publisher, market mechanisms would tend to reduce in-
accuracy, because the demand for a template would be a function of
its utility to the user. The greater the value to the end user, the higher
the potential profits to the producer would tend to be.27
An additional risk in using templates arises where a template it-
self acquires influence within a system.28 Here a kind of infinite re-
gress problem arises: would one always need a template to explain the
use of a template? In some cases, this may limit the utility of tem-
plates, but even where it occurs this does not eliminate the value of
the template; it merely reduces it. Moreover, in a wide range of cases
the problem will not arise because the template will not acquire influ-
ence over decision makers within the system. In general, it is likely to
arise only where a template is provided by a public authority. Pri-
vately issued templates may, for example, be of much value to outsid-
ers, but they are not likely to have influence on decisions within the
system. Finally, the information that is provided in templates will of-
ten be objective and not require additional information for its inter-
pretation. For example, a template that contained the information
that private litigation is not available in a competition law system
would provide the user with valuable data about the influence of a
text, but that value would not depend on the acquisition of additional
information for its interpretation.
Costs could be a deterrent to developing authority templates, but
they need not be. An institution (or person) must prepare the infor-
mation and "attach" it to the text, and this entails potentially signifi-
cant costs. The extent and distribution of costs would, however,
depend on who provided them and how much information they con-
tained. If government institutions provide "official" templates for a
large number of statutes, the public cost could be significant. There is,
however, no reason that a government would have to provide tem-
plates for all statutes. It could provide them only for the most impor-
27. Assessment of utility may be difficult to measure in the short run, but with Internet
communications, this problem should normally be of limited duration.
28. It is important to note how this problem differs from the one just described. Here the
problem arises precisely because the template influences decisions within the system and may,
therefore, call for additional information relating to that influence. In the prior case, the prob-
lem does not involve the authority of the template, but only the accuracy of the information it
contains.
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tant or difficult statutes. Moreover, private publishers could provide
such templates and thereby internalize the costs to the users.
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This brief Article has focused on a specific problem that arises in
the use of language to acquire knowledge of foreign law. It has identi-
fied the potential risks of using a strategy that is common throughout
the legal world-reliance on authoritative texts from a foreign system
in gaining knowledge of law in that system. It has shown that this
strategy is likely to produce distorted knowledge.
It has also identified the cause: it lies in a feature of language that
is specific to law-namely, its role in influencing legal decisions. Legal
texts acquire meaning insofar as they influence legal decisions, and
thus their authority or influence with respect to relevant decision
makers is central to understanding the text. In order to interpret a
text effectively, the user must use interpretive tools ("heuristics") that
are based on knowledge of this authority. An outside user of the text
is likely to use the wrong heuristics in predicting the influence of the
text and therefore acquire distorted knowledge of law in the target
system. By recognizing that the capacity of a text to produce accurate
knowledge to an outside user tends to be inversely related to its au-
thority within that system, strategies can be developed that will re-
duce this distortion.
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